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FAMILY LAW
Dan Hopson, Jr.*
While the Soviets rattled their rockets, the Kansas Supreme Court
calmly settled the eleven family law cases brought before it during the
Survey period. As so frequently happens, even those eleven included many
"fact" appeals. However, the cases presented some interesting issues. The
court was forced to make a little "new" law. Handling most of the
cases correctly and with dispatch, the court had a good year.
The 1957 legislature practically ignored family law. It enacted only
a few minor amendments, but did revise the juvenile court code.
I. CHILDREN
Wahl v. Walsh' reaffirmed Kansas' minority position that an illegiti-
mate child has a common law right to sue his father for support. The
Kansas court had early held that it could create such a right2 even though
the common law treated bastards as nullius filies and despite the fact
that the legislature had provided a bastardy proceeding.' When the
needs of the people of the state change, the court felt it could create new
rights.'
In this case, neither the child, the mother, nor the defendant father
were domiciliaries of Kansas. The defendant claimed that the law of
Washington, the domicile of the mother and child, was applicable. And
Washington law did not allow this type of action. The Kansas court
rejected this argument and, citing Moore v. State ex rel.,' a statutory
bastardy case, held that support actions were transitory. The child could
sue in Kansas. The court concluded: "... as we view the matter, no
question of conflicts of laws is involved ... 
While the result is tenable, both the courts and counsel for the defend-
* Assistant Dean, University of Kansas School of Law. A.B. 1951, LL.B. 1953, Kansas Uni-
versity; LL.M. 1954, Yale University.
1 180 Kan. 313, 304 P.2d 525 (1956). This case had previously been before the court on an
appeal from an overruling of a demurrer to the petition; Wahl v. Walsh, 177 Kan. 176, 277
P.2d 623 (1954).
'Doughty v. Engler, 112 Kan. 583, 211 Pac. 619, 30 A.L.R. 1065 (1923). And see Myers v.
Anderson, 145 Kan. 775, 67 P.2d 542 (1937).
'KAN. G.S. 1949, 62-2301 to 2321.
'KAN. G.S. 1949, 77-109 provides that: "The common law as modified by constitutional
and statutory law, judicial decisions, and the conditions and wants of the people, shall remain
in force in aid of the General Statutes of this state ...." See Note, 6 KAN. L. REv. 95 (1957),
discussing this aspect of the Wahl case, while analyzing Whitcomb v. Huffington; see text circa
note 7 inIra.
547 Kan. 772, 28 Pac. 1072, 17 L.R.A. 714 (1892).
6 180 Kan. at 318, 304 P.2d at 528.
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ant apparently failed to distinguish between the problem of jurisdiction
and that of choice of law. Whether Kansas could hear the action, the
jurisdictional question, is different from whose law should be used to
determine the rights of the parties, the choice of law question. The first
issue turns on whether this suit is local or transitory. The court probably
correctly decided that Kansas did have legislative jurisdiction and there-
fore the action was transitory.
But the court stopped there. Having decided the jurisdictional ques-
tion, it should have then resolved the choice of law problem. The court
must determine which state-that of the domicile or that of the forum-
had the greatest interest in determining the right to support. Perhaps
Kansas could hear the case, but the question is-should it? The court's
decision allows forum shopping on the part of illegitimate children.
Whenever the state of their domicile prevents suits, which will be quite
frequently, they will lie in wait and hope to serve the putative father as
he passes through Kansas.
The purpose of the rules of conflict of laws is to inform courts whether
they should apply the law of the forum or the law of some other state
having an interest in the results. The goal is uniformity. No matter
where the suit is brought, the same law should be applied to the facts
of the case. The Wahl decision subverts that policy. While Kansas has
the right to choose its own law, the interest of the State in the suit is
weak. The Kansas Supreme Court should have chosen to apply the law
of the domicile, the state having the greatest interest.
Having broadened the rights of children in the Wahl case, the court
refused to aid them in Whitcomb v. Huffington.7 There, the court re-
viewed the arguments and held that while it had the power, it would
not create a right in children to sue the lover of their mother for alien-
ation of affections. The court admitted that a few jurisdictions have
created such a right,' but declined to follow. Such suits cause more harm
than good, suggested the court. If there are to be new rights in this field,
the legislature will have to provide them.'
The Kansas Legislature passed two statutes affecting children during
the 1957 session. It amended KAN. G.S. 1955 Supp., 37-711 to increase
from a misdemeanor to a felony the intentional solicitation of a child
' 180 Kan. 340, 304 P.2d 465 (1956); 6 KAN. L. REv. 95 (1957).
'For arguments in favor of such a right, see Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945).
And see Annot., 162 A.L.R. 819 (1946) for the stand of the other states.
'For a discussion of a validity of the arguments, pro and con, see Note 6 KAN. L. REV. 95
(1957). The other cases concerning child custody and child support in divorce cases are discussed
under that heading infra.
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under twelve to commit an immoral act.1° If the child is under eighteen,
but over twelve, the solicitation remains a misdemeanor.
And, for the first time since 1905, the legislature made extensive
revisions in the Kansas Juvenile Code." While there are some contro-
versial changes, the code is a needed improvement. The statute provides
for increased protection to children while, at the same time, it allows
the court to make full use of available community resources.'
II. DIvoRCE
Child Custody: The bulk of the Kansas family law appeals raised the
issue of the propriety of a child custody order. Three cases are familiar
ones, as the bitterness over the fight for the children continues to force re-
peated litigation.
In Heilman v. Heilman," the third appeal to the Kansas Supreme
Court," the appellate bench upheld the trial court's order granting the
mother custody. In the second appeal, the court had said, in dicta,"5
that in a contest with paternal grandparents, a trial court could not
deprive a mother of custody unless it found her unfit. The mother then
started a new suit and, on virtually the same evidence as that presented
in the second case, induced the trial court to again find her a fit and
proper person and to award her custody. The grandmother appealed.
She protested that (1) the mother gave her inadequate notice of the hear-
ing; (2) the court did not appoint a guardian ad litum for the minor;
and (3) the court had not given notice to the father.
The supreme court easily dismissed the first two arguments. Five
days notice did not violate the fourteenth amendment nor need a guardian
be appointed when the child is not a party. But the court had some
trouble with the final argument. Notice must be given to all interested
parties.' And certainly a parent is an "interested" party. However, the
court, construing Lamberson v. Lamberson" and Bailey v. Bailey, 8
50 Kan. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 258.
"Kan. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 256, amending and repealing various sections of chapter 38 of
the GENERAL STATUTES Of 1949.
' No attempt will be made in this Survey to point up the changes as a comment on the new
Code and the use made of it by juvenile courts will appear in a subsequent issue of the KANSAS
LAW REVIEW.
' 181 Kan. 467, 312 P.2d 622 (1957).
"See Heilman v. Heilman, 180 Kan. 116, 299 P.2d 601 (1956) (second appeal); In re
Heilman, 176 Kan. 5, 269 P.2d 459 (1954) (first appeal), discussed in Hopson, Family Law, 5
KAN. L. REV. 255, 261 (1956).
The appeal had not been properly affected. The court admitted that all statements as to
the validity of the trial court's action were dicta.
"°The court has interpreted KAN. G.S. 1955 Supp., 60-1510 to require notice to all interested
parties. See Purdy v. Ernest 93 Kan. 157, 143 Pac. 429 (1914).
17 164 Kan. 38, 187 P.2d 366 (1947).
's 164 Kan. 653, 192 P.2d 190 (1948).
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concluded that unless the parent had custody, or the right to custody
under a previous order, no notice need be sent.' 9 But the court caveats.
The trial court may, at its discretion, require notice in a particular case.
However, unless other facts are shown, a trial court is not in error when
it dispenses with notice. Certainly this decision is important for future
litigation.
In Leach v. Leach,2" the supreme court emphatically approved the
rule, expounded in Christlieb v. Christlieb2" and the second Heilman
case, 22 that in a contest between grandparents and a "fit" parent, custody
may not be split. After the first appeal in this case, 23 holding that the
father had the right to custody as against the mother, the maternal
grandparents obtained from the trial court the right of possession of the
child for a two-day weekend every sixty days. The father, now living in
Omaha, asked the trial court to change the award as he was financially
unable to bring the children to Wichita (the grandmother's home)
every two months. From a refusal of the trial court to change the award,
the father appealed. The supreme court held that the "possession" given
by the decree24 was more than a mere visitation right. Since custody
may not be split, the trial court's award was erroneous.
The supreme court did not specifically hold that "possession" and
"custody" were synonymous, but certainly it left the implication that
an award giving possession was effectively the same as a custody
award. Apparently the district court, prohibited from splitting custody,
"The Bailey case is authority for the rule that where, in an action for divorce and custody
of a minor child, the trial court makes an order fixing custody and at a later date a proceeding
is instituted to change such custody, the court may make such an order only where the person
having custody, or right to custody of the child under the previous order, has had notice of the
proceeding to change custody and an opportunity to defend. Further, under the facts of that
case, the decision is authority for the proposition that notice to the mother of the motion for
change of custody was unnecessary.
"As applied to the facts and circumstances of the case before us, the rule is clear. Here the
grandmother had previously been awarded partial custody and she was given notice of the
hearing as is required under the rule in the Bailey case. The father, not having custody, or a
right to custody under a previous order, was not served with notice of the hearing and, under
the rule of the Bailey case, was not entitled thereto as a matter of law." 181 Kan. at 473, 312
P.2d at 626 (1957).
20 180 Kan. 545, 306 P.2d 193 (1957).
' 179 Kan. 408, 295 P.2d 658 (1956).
'See note 14 supra.
2"Leach v. Leach, 179 Kan. 557, 296 P.2d 1078 (1956); see Hopson, Family Law, 5 KAN.
L. REv. 255, 260 (1956).
"The district court's order read as follows: "It is, therefore, by the court ordered and
decreed that the parents of the plaintiff be and they are hereby granted the right of visitation
with said minor child and the right to have the person of said minor child in their possession
on the last weekend in January, 1956, starting January 28, 1956, and that they are further
granted the privilege of visitation and having the person of said minor child in their possession
on each weekend every 60 days thereafter until the further order of the Court, and the defendant
is ordered to deliver said child to said maternal grandparents at said time. (Emphasis supplied.)"
180 Kan. at 546, 306 P.2d at 194 (1957).
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may not give to grandparents "visitation rights" if visitation includes
the right to have the children in their home.
The other side of the rule was reaffirmed in Goetz v. Goetz.2" There
the mother received custody, but the father was granted the right to
have the children for part of the summer. On an appeal on other issues,
the mother also complained of this splitting. The supreme court affirmed
the trial court and pointed out that both parents were found fit. As sug-
gested in last year's Survey and affirmed in this decision and in the Leach
case, discussed above, if the contest is between parents and both are fit,
custody may be split. If the fight is between grandparents and a parent,
even though both are fit, the parent must receive total custody.
The supreme court faced a tricky and very difficult question in
Jackson v. Jackson. 6 On the first appeal,27 the supreme court affirmed
the trial court's decree granting the wife a divorce and custody of the
three children. In the summer of 1955, the husband moved for a change
in the custody order. The wife had remarried and joined the Jehovah's
Witnesses. The trial court found that the mother had recovered from a
nervous breakdown sustained after the prior divorce decree. But the cause
of her breakdown, her religious beliefs, still existed. The husband intro-
duced considerable testimony on her religious beliefs and, more particu-
larly, on the beliefs of the children as to war and military service. The
trial court granted custody to the father.
On appeal, the supreme court rather reluctantly reversed. Citing
Denton v. James,2" the court said that religious beliefs should not deter-
mine custody awards. The church and state are separate. While the trial
court has wide discretion to determine what is best for the child, the
court's view of the merits of a particular sect is of no importance. Al-
though there was evidence of other valid grounds for granting the father
custody, the record was too permeated with the religious testimony.
Justice Price, joined by Justice Wertz, pointed up the crux of the
problem in his dissent.
"... in a dispute relating to custody religious views afford no ground for
depriving a parent of custody who is otherwise qualified, but I think it
may not be said that here the trial court's decision was based solely on the
ground of religion. In fact, conclusions 1 and 2 make it clear that it was
not. If a divorced parent's extreme religious views and activities are such as
180 Kan. 569, 306 P.2d 167 (1957).
181 Kan. 1, 309 P.2d 705 (1957). A discussion of the problem in this case will be found
in a note on Lynch v. Uhlenhoop, 78 N.W.2d 491 (Iowa 1956), appearing in the November,
1957, issue of the KANSAS BAR JOURNAL.
"7Jackson v. Jackson, 175 Kan. 418, 264 P.2d 1087 (1953).
107 Kan. 729, 193 Pac. 307 (1920).
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to result in emotional instability in such parent, then most certainly I feel that
a trial court has not only the right, but the duty to take such fact into con-
sideration in the determination of what appears to be the welfare and best
interests of the child and to which parent custody should be granted. As I
read this record, that, in reality, was what was done in this case."' 29
The majority skirted the problem in finding religion to be the test
used by the trial court. Surely there comes a point at which religious
belief becomes so extreme as not to be accorded first amendment pro-
tection." Yet, how is a trial court to draw the line? On retrial, the con-
scientious judge will have a puzzling problem.
Child Support: In recent years, the Kansas Supreme Court has re-
shuffled the status of the child support portion of a divorce decree." In
1949, the court declared that execution could levy on such decrees with-
out first obtaining a judgment for the past due amount. 2 And in the
1956 case of Ortiz v. Ortiz,"8 the court stabilized that view.
The plaintiff mother sued the defendant husband, asking for a judg-
ment for the previous five years of unpaid child support. He contended
that since the child had married two years after the original divorce
decree, the mother could claim only from the date of the decree to the
date of the marriage; that at most she could claim only amounts actually
expended; that the decree should be modified so that there should be
no payment owing from the date of the marriage to the date of this
suit; and that all future payments should be eliminated.
The trial court refused to grant a new judgment, struck from the
record the amount owed from the date of the marriage to the date of
trial, and eliminated any future payments. The wife appealed. She did
not complain of the elimination of any future payments and the husband
did not complain about the payments owing from the date of divorce to
the date of marriage. Two issues remained: Should the court have entered
a new judgment? And should the court have retroactively modified the
amounts owing from the date of marriage to the date of suit?
The supreme court, following Haynes v. Haynes,4 held that the
wife had a judgment that was valid and could be computed. Therefore,
the trial court need not enter a new judgment.8 Actually the Haynes
181 Kan. at 12, 309 P.2d at 714 (1957).
'°See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) where the court upholds a federal
bigamy statute aimed at Utah Mormans.
'
1 See Haynes v. Haynes, 168 Kan. 219, 212 P.2d 312 (1949); Comment, Past Due Installments
ol Alimony and Child Support in Kansas, 1 KAN. L. REV. 71 (1952).
'lbid. And see Hopson, Family Law, 4 KAN. L. REV. 224, 230 (1955).
180 Kan. 334, 304 P.2d 490 (1956).
168 Kan. 219, 212 P.2d 312 (1949).
SBut see Brunhoeber v. Brunhoeber, 180 Kan. 396, 304 P.2d 521 (1956), where the court,
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case only held that in a contempt proceeding, the wife was not entitled to
have her motion to reduce the amount to judgment sustained. However,
the court was willing to extend the logic of the case to the situation where
the wife sought a judgment in an independent suit.
On the second issue, the court found that the support judgment could
not later be modified as to amounts due and owing. The court quoted
liberally from the Haynes decision, emphasizing the final and execution
properties of the judgment, and pointed out that the later cases, following
Haynes, had so held."6
While prior to the Haynes case, the court had held that support judg-
ments were not modifiable retroactively,37 it did not cite any of the pre-
Haynes cases. Early in its history, the court had held that execution could
not levy on a support or alimony judgment.3 8 However, starting with
Sharp v. Sharp,9 it shifted ground. By 1949, in the Haynes case, the
court was willing to hold such judgments final and allow execution to
levy without obtaining a new judgment. Apparently the court did not
cite any of the earlier cases since it felt that finality and execution must
logically precede non-modifiability of judgments.
The Haynes and Ortiz cases have almost elevated support judgments
to the level of other money judgments. All that is now left to establish
the respectability of such judgments is a clear holding that they operate
as a lien on the property of the husband without the district court spe-
cifically so directing.4"
In the Goetz case," the court endorsed the trial court's decree of
$200 per month for the two children. The parties were well to do, and
the mother felt the amount inadequate. The supreme court reminded
her that if her progenies were impoverished, she could move for an
increase.
Grounds: Here, on some collateral issues, the court quietly shifted
in dicta, said that if there is a subsequent promise to pay the back due installments, that promise
may be enforced in a separate suit. This dicta does not detract from the above holdings, however.
In the Ortiz case, there was no subsequent promise. See text circa note 60 inIra for a discussion
of another aspect of this case.
" The court quoted from Teegarden v. Teegarden, 155 Kan. 195, 124 P.2d 464 (1942) and
cited such cases as Andrews v. Andrews, 171 Kan. 616, 237 P.2d 418 (1951) and Anderson v.
Anderson, 155 Kan. 69, 123 P.2d 315 (1942).
" See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 147 Kan. 485, 77 P.2d 946 (1938). See also the cases
cited in Comment, Past Due Installments of Alimony and Child Support in Kansas, 1 KAN. L.
REv. 71, 74, n. 20 (1952).
'See, e.g., McGill v. McGill, 101 Kan. 324, 166 Pac. 501 (1917); Cheever v. Kelly, 96 Kan.
269, 150 Pac. 529 (1915); Scott v. Scott, 80 Kan. 489, 103 Pac. 1005 (1909).
154 Kan. 175, 117 P.2d 561 (1941).
'o See Comment, Past Due Installments of Alimony and Child Support in Kansas, 1 KAN. L.
REV. 71 (1952).
" See text circa note 25 supra.
1957]
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
gears. In Hoppe v. Hoppe,42 the wife sued for divorce alleging cruelty.
The trial court granted the divorce and the husband appealed. The
evidence showed that the husband quarreled with his wife over money
matters, used vile and abusive language, refused to give her money,
would not take her out, attempted to give her pills which would cause
a miscarriage and denied parentage of her child. When the wife wanted
to leave, the husband threatened to either kill or disfigure her. The
husband protested that this was insufficient evidence of cruelty. The court
disagreed.48
The husband also claimed lack of corroboration. The wife produced
a deposition of a neighbor from their former home in Pennsylvania which
corroborated the "unrelenting nagging, swearing and accusations, and
denial of the parentage. . . .""' The court said:
The principal reason for the requirement of corroboration has been and
is for the prevention of collusion between the parties to a divorce action. It
is not essential that it alone sustain the judgment or that it support the
plaintiff's testimony as to all the allegations. 45
And to this the court added:
The corroboration required by the statute (G.S. 1949, 60-1509) ...does
not mean that it is necessary that corroboration support plaintiff throughout
the course of mistreatment or as to every detail of her testimony. However,
the corroboration should be such as will tend to establish some fact or facts
testified to by plaintiff so as to make her testimony more probable and legally
acceptable. . . . [T]he remoteness of the acts which are corroborated as
affecting the sufficiency of the corroboration in general is a question largely
within the discretion of the trial court.46
In the Goetz case,47 the court indicated, without reviewing the evi-
dence, that corroboration need only be circumstantial.
Perhaps these two cases indicate a relaxing of the corroboration re-
quirement. In earlier cases, the court said, usually in dicta as there was
either no corroboration at all or else a substantial amount, that corrobor-
ation must be of the statutory grounds and not to mere indignities and
42 181 Kan. 428, 312 P.2d 215 (1957).
"The court said: "Suffice it to say, there was evidence which tended to show a course of
conduct on the part of the defendant toward the plaintiff extending over a period from 1948
until the time she left home in 1954 which humiliated and degraded her, and that defendant's
deliberate and persistent mistreatment of plaintiff was sufficient to undermine her health and
seriously affect her both physically and mentally. . . .We are of the opinion that the unjustifiable
and long-practiced course of conduct by defendant utterly destroyed the legitimate ends and
objects of the marriage and constituted extreme cruelty, even though no actual physical or
personal violence was inflicted." 181 Kan. at 430, 312 P.2d at 218 (1957).
181 Kan. at 431, 312 P.2d at 218 (1957).
Ibid.
181 Kan. at 431, 312 P.2d at 219 (1957).
"See text circa note 25 supra.
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abuses which in themselves are not sufficient."' In Walton v. Walton,49
the plaintiff argued that the statute was aimed at collusion and that
since there was no collusion in this case, corroboration should not be
required. The court disagreed. It said that collusion was not the only
reason for the requirement" and denied the divorce.
As the Hoppe case, quoted above, shows, the court is now looking
for collusion since it feels that KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-1509 is aimed at pre-
venting this. If it is not suspicious, it will allow the divorce.
In the Goetz case, condonation was also at issue. The wife had sued
for divorce back in 1953, but before trial, the spouses reconciled their
problems. They agreed to sell the business of the husband and move to
another city. He agreed to quit drinking, to love her and to give her the
joint bank account. She also agreed to condone his offenses.
When the trial court refused to grant her the divorce, presumably on
the ground that he had shown condonation, she argued the hornbook
rule that condonation is conditional51 and that lesser acts will revive
former acts of cruelty. 2 The court agreed on the state of the law, but
found that she made no showing that he had not lived up to the recon-
ciliation agreement.
53
Neither opinion adds much to the existing law, but both illustrate
the increasing willingness of the supreme court to coast, leaving to the
trial court its freedom to universally grant divorces. If need be, the high
court is even willing to limit defenses and hold weak evidence of fault
sufficient.
Notice: The 1957 Legislature amended the publication notice statute54
to conform to the decision of the Kansas Supreme Court in Schooler v.
Schooler 5 The second paragraph of 60-2525 will now expressly provide
'
8 See, e.g., Rosander v. Rosander, 177 Kan. 45, 276 P.2d 338 (1954) (no corroboration at
all-dicta); Smeltzer v. Smeltzer, 175 Kan. 293, 262 P.2d 826 (1953) (corroboration of trivial
matters only); Thornbrugh v. Thornbrugh, 175 Kan. 56, 259 P.2d 219 (1953) (corroboration
found, but evidence not detailed--dicta); Tuley v. Tuley, 168 Kan. 106, 211 P.2d 95 (1949)
(corroboration found, but evidence not detailed-dicta).
"' 166 Kan. 391, 202 P.2d 197 (1949).
'The court, quoting from Frye v. Frye, 134 Kan. 3, 4, 4 P.2d 415 (1931), said: " 'The state
is interested in the marriage relation and the fostering, protecting and permanency of it as an
institution of society. The state is interested in preventing the disruption of the marital relation
upon petty or unimportant causes or for any reason other than those prescribed by the legislature
as grounds for the dissolution of the relation.' " 166 Kan. at 394, 202 P.2d at 200.
" See, e.g., Reiter v. Reiter, 162 Kan. 275, 176 P.2d 260 (1947).
"See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 171 Kan. 249, 232 P.2d 603 (1951).
r The court apparently assumed, correctly, that if the husband lived up to the agreement, he
would not be guilty of cruelty or gross neglect of duty.
"' Kan. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 326, amending KAN. G.S. 1955 Supp., 60-2525.
' 175 Kan. 201, 263 P.2d 233 (1953); See Hopson, Family Law, 4 KAN. L. REv. 224, 234
(1955). There the court held that KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-2525 (para. 5), which allowed publication
service in all actions "where the defendant being a resident of this state, has departed therefrom,
or from the county of his residence, with the intent to delay or defraud . . . ," could be used
in a divorce case, despite the fact that the second paragraph provides for service in divorce
actions. The court did not feel that the second paragraph was exclusive.
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that if the plaintiff in a divorce action is unable, with due diligence, to
make service, he may use publication notice.
Property Rights: In dicta in the Hoppe case, " following the old
United States Supreme Court case of Fall v. Eastin" the court said that
Kansas could not try title to Pennsylvania land even though the court,
acting in personam only, could order one of the parties to convey. The
supreme court refused to accept the argument of the husband that
KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-1511, the general property division statute, gave the
court power to try title to foreign land.
In the Goetz case,"8 the wife complained of the property division, but
the supreme court found no abuse. The court reiterated the rule that
the division did not have to be equal.
Miscellaneous: In Jackson v. Jackson,9 the husband argued that the
wife could not complain of the custody order since she had accepted
attorney fees given her on order of the district court. The high court
summarily dismissed the argument. If the wife has a right to attorney
fees, she has the right whether she wins or loses on other matters. How
could she fully benefit from her right to a husband-paid counsel if she
could not accept the attorney fees?
In Brunhoeber v. Brunhoeber,6 ° the court said, also in dicta,6 ' that
a promise to pay certain debts owing prior to a divorce settlement was
enforceable. The moral duty to pay was sufficient consideration. The
case raises the interesting question, not discussed by the court, of whether
the court should distinguish between those separation agreements merged
in the divorce judgment and those only approved by the court at the
time of the divorce, when it examines the enforceability of subsequent
promises.
While the appeal was pending in the first Goetz case, 2 the wife
refused to turn the children over to the husband for the summer vacation
as the district court had ordered. On a contempt citation, the trial court
held the wife in contempt and sentenced her to ninety days in jail.
In Goetz v. Goetz,68 the supreme court upheld the findings of con-
' See text circa note 42 supra. The statement is merely dicta since the issue had not been
raised at the trial and therefore could not be raised on appeal.
5'215 U.S. 1 (1909).
See text circa note 25 supra.
o See text circa note 26 supra.
180 Kan. 396, 304 P.2d 521 (1956). A case note on this decision will appear in a later issue
of the REVIEW.
" The plaintiff failed to allege a condition precedent. Defendant's demurrer was sustained
on that ground.
e' See text circa note 25 supra.
e' 181 Kan. 128, 309 P.2d 655 (1957).
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tempt, but overruled the trial court's sentence. The wife had filed a
supersedeas bond pending appeal." She argued that the bond allowed
her to ignore the orders of the trial court. The court disagreed on two
grounds: First, the supersedeas statute allowed stay only in four situations
-payment of money, execution of a conveyance, sale or delivery of real
property, and delivery of a document. Since a child custody order was
none of these, the bond did not supersede the trial court's order. Second,
KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-1510, provides for continuing jurisdiction in custody
matters. Therefore, unless the supreme court issues an order of temporary
custody,65 the trial court continues to have jurisdiction pending the
appeal.
The court did find that the sentence was erroneous. The wife had no
separate trial brought in the name of the state on the contempt charge.
Therefore, a definite term sentence, which is the sentence for criminal
contempt, was beyond the power of the trial court. The sentence should
have ordered the wife to remain in jail until she purged herself of
contempt.
III. INCOMPETENT PERSONS
In Sands v. Donge,6 the petitioner, an incompetent, misconceived
her remedy. She wanted to be restored to capacity and to be free from her
appointed guardian. For some reason, she sought a writ of habeas corpus
from a district court. Stating in her petition that she was now competent,
she claimed her guardian was "imprisoning" her. The guardian's de-
murrer was sustained and the supreme court affirmed. KAN. G.S. 1949,
59-2268 states a procedure for restoration to capacity before the probate
court. The legislative intent was to make that procedure exclusive. Since
petitioner neither alleged that she had been restored, nor that the original
judgment was void, habeas corpus was an improper method of testing
her sanity.
This decision is sound. Although the court, in In re Estate of Correll,67
held that the director of a state mental hospital could restore to capacity,
the basic legislative policy is that of funneling all questions of competency
through the probate court. Incompetency is not a jurisdictional fact.
Consequently, competency may not be used as a ground for collateral
attack.
" This is allowed by KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-3322.
'See, e.g., Ogg v. Ogg, 126 Kan. 310, 267 Pac. 977 (1928).
o 181 Kan. 325, 311 P.2d 321 (1957).
o' 178 Kan. 618, 290 P.2d 1050 (1955).
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IV. CONCLUSION
At the close of last year's Survey, two areas were predicted to produce
future litigation-the unfitness doctrine and the separation agreement
in divorce. The Kansas court decided no separation agreement cases
this year. The questions left from last year remain unanswered. In the
custody area, the court emphatically continued on its predetermined
course: unless a parent is found unfit, custody may not be given to a
grandparent. Therefore, custody may not be divided, even though it be
in the best interests of the child.
In all other areas, the court settled minor problems, disposing of
several fact appeals. To a large extent, the court merely attempted to
aid district courts in using common sense to work out the complex
human problems of today's world. 8
'The cases decided by the Kansas Federal Distirct Court and the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit were examined, but no family law cases were found.
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